Saturday, December 12, 2009

The Part They Were Born to Play: The Role of the American Indian Movement’s Leaders in the Occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1972.

During the week of the 1972 presidential elections large caravans of Indians participating in the Trail of Broken Treaties arrived in Washington D.C. to voice grievances concerning an array of Indian issues and to present a thesis on Indian treaty rights to the White House. The demonstration was the victim of disorganization and miscommunication and resulted in a militant occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building (BIA).1 The occupation of the building was not a planned event but the events preceding the occupation put into context the dire state of U.S. Indian affairs that had been articulated by the leaders of the Trail of Broken Treaties; this ill advised occupation forced the leadership of the caravan to accept new roles of Indian activism and at the same time revealed the perplexity of their character.

The leaders of the occupation were not newcomers to Indian leadership. In fact, the leaders who took charge during the occupation were experienced activist by 1972. However, it was not until the incidents of November 1972 that these leaders fully embraced a new brand of protest and showed what their movement thus far lacked in regards to experience. The results of the occupation were mixed but ultimately led to later militant activity.

Historians have noted the frenzied political climate of the 1960s and early 1970s. Student anti-war protest and the black civil rights movement of the early and mid 1960s fueled the flames of protest. This was also the case for American Indians. Thus, by the beginning of the 1970s, Native Americans were armed with at least some protest experience and leaders necessary for serious political activism and protest. Separate elements of the mobilization and organization of Indians were supplied by often controversial activist such as Dennis Banks, Russell Means, Hank Adams and Robert Burnette. These leaders played crucial roles in the occupation of the BIA in Washington D.C. in 1972.

These leaders were aware of the social climate of the era and took cues from non-Indian groups such as the Black Panthers which can help to explain the cataclysmic events that took place that week in Washington2. Together the Indian leaders of the caravan brought to the table many different elements of the Red Power movement. Pan-Indian ideology was an emerging thought among many Indian groups and the Trail of Broken Treaties was supposed to be a unifying event; unfortunately the event distanced some Indian groups from one another. The march also took place in spite of recent goodwill to Indians by the Nixon administration.3

President Richard Nixon’s first term in office was considered an enormous success in regard to Indian issues. Nixon was even hailed as the “Abe Lincoln of the Indian people” by some that favored his policies, particularly the repeal of the 1953 house concurrent resolution on Indian assimilation and his promotion of Indian self determination4. Others felt that Nixon’s Indian policy was one of “Self-Termination” where Indians would eventually assimilate into the mainstream of America on their own. 5 Despite the recent progress of the Nixon administration many Indians residing both in urban areas and on reservations still lived in squalor. For instance, the average life expectancy was only 47 years for Indians nation wide in 1970. The hellacious social conditions were not exempted from the Urban Indian community which suffered a staggering unemployment rate despite government assistance programs for relocation into cities6. The Indians participating in the protest did not share the pro-Nixon sentiment held by Indian groups closer to Washington such as the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association (NTCA). This is dramatically apparent in the choice to protest the week of Nixon’s Incumbent election.

Economic hardship, alcoholism, and racism were all part of the Indian experience in the 1960s and 1970s and some felt that both Washington and Indian apathy were to blame. In cities such as Minneapolis, Chicago, and Milwaukee there was a significant Indian population and urban Indian advocacy came to shape in the twin cities with the emergence of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in 1968. By the dawn of the 1970s, AIM was gaining a significant voice in the Indian movement despite their reputation for staging publicity stunts. AIM promoted civil disobedience and had staged protest by occupying and demonstrating at such sites as Mt. Rushmore, Plymouth Rock, and various government buildings.7 After the Trail of Broken Treaties, AIM was dismissed as violent and irrational by more conservative Indian groups that worked more in accord with the BIA and the Washington bureaucracy.

The original goal of AIM was to monitor drunk and disorderly charges that Minneapolis Indians felt were racist exercises that often resulted in police brutality. During this period, a quota policy was practiced by police in the city and Indians found that jail time was a commonly shared experience. Alcoholism was a serious vice for many Indians both on and off reservations.8 Racism was a main concern of the organization, one that made AIM differ from other organizations and resemble many black militant groups of the era.

For instance, during the early 1960s Dennis Banks, an Anishinaabe living in Minneapolis, was arrested over 20 times for public drunkenness. Banks and Clyde Bellencourt, another Anishinaabe living in Minneapolis, started AIM in the late 1960s. Together the men started patrols to give drunken Indians rides home and observed arrest for excessive force. Arrest in Minneapolis decreased dramatically. With this success Banks and Bellencourt began to start AIM chapters in an increasing number of urban areas.9 AIM’s constituency, which consisted mostly of urban Indians, promoted a Pan-Indian spirit that tribal groups had struggled with in the previous generation. Dennis Banks and Clyde Bellencourt both emerged as leaders in the occupation of the BIA in 1972.

As AIM grew in constituency and its agenda strengthened, Banks felt that the organization lacked a spiritual direction. Indians did not have a religious base since many had grown up in the white boarding schools. In search of his own spirituality Banks traveled to the residence of a Rosebud Lakota spiritual leader named Henry Crow Dog. There Banks smoked the sacred tobacco, heard the sacred drums, and participated in a traditional vision seeking journey known as the Sun Dance. This re-discovery of the native religion was Banks most significant contribution to the rhetoric of AIM. AIM sought to restore traditional Indian identity to its people. Later the caravans headed to Washington would be led with the sacred drum and pipe. The AIM experience embraced the Sun Dance way of life. 10

Clyde Bellencourt had a similar experience of spiritual awakening. Bellencourt had decided to starve himself to an early death while serving a burglary sentence at Stillwater State Prison in the late 1960s. A fellow inmate and Chippewa began to speak to Bellencourt about traditional Indian culture. Bellencourt began to believe that all the things that had been taken away from Indians and had left them in their current despair. He began to read Ojibway literature, researching the old Indian religion, and resumed eating. The recognition of Clyde’s Indian identity spurred his own self-determination. Bellencourt became perhaps the most headstrong figure in AIM, even from the first assembly.

Russell Means also shared the troubled American Indian experience. Means activist roots began after a move from a reservation to Cleveland after years of rambling and even a few years on what could be considered skid row. Cleveland was the most failed city of a BIA relocation project aimed at assisting Indian immigrants to major U.S. cities despite financial assistance for housing and workforce development. To fill quotas Indians from all over the country were sent to Cleveland by the BIA project11. This created a highly diverse Indian community in the city. Means vigor and attitude towards his own self-determination found him fighting the relocation system and squeezing every penny from the BIA run program to stand on his feet and provide for his family. Means demanded a well paying job, improved housing conditions for his family, and even threatened to report secretaries who would not show him their budgets after he saw the deplorable conditions of relocated Indians to the city. This street-savvy was not typical behavior of Indians but as the outspoken Means put it himself, “we now possessed the verbal skills needed to demand change.” This self-awareness would be crucial in the years to come12.

Later in 1968, Means and other Cleveland Indians organized the Cleveland American Indians Center to promote Indian self-determination. Means reputation for speaking ability earned him a personal invitation from Dennis Banks to speak at a convention of the National Council of Churches. At this meeting AIM voiced a number of complaints to the council that represented numerous Christian American denominations. These complaints concerned pocketed funds by churches of allocated charity money for Indians; at least this was the view of AIM. Means was captivated by AIM at this convention, especially by Bellencourt. Means has said that the words of a pamphlet at the meeting immediately swore his allegiance to AIM. It was a quote from Nez Perce Chief Joseph and it read:

    Let me be a free man, free to travel, free to stop, free to work, free to trade where I choose, free to choose my own teachers, free to follow the religion of my fathers free to talk, think, and act for myself – and I will obey every law or submit to the penalty.13

AIM’s leaders embodied the Indian spirit and practiced the old Indian religion. These same leaders also had past as convicts and problem drinkers just as the majority of Indians in the country. What set AIM apart from Indian organizations before its time was the overhaul in Ideology that allowed Means, Banks, and Bellencourt to embrace their so called Indianness. 14 These conversion experiences overtook the whole of these men’s lives even to their attire. Traditional Indian garb and braids were hallmarks of AIM’s image. The shift in attitude and religion seems to have given these men powerful convictions that often resulted in radical behavior. AIM always led by example.

It is also important to note that the combination of these personalities had the potential to be explosive. After all, AIM was a militant organization founded and ran by convicts. The new found religious zeal and Indian identity possessed by these men was powerful and captivating. The political climate of the era helped to provide an audience for these men but also fueled fervor. Russell Means’ outspoken nature made him the most loved and hated man in the leadership of AIM.15 It is also important to note that these leaders were not the first militant Indian activist but that they did draw on the experiences of earlier groups as a catapult to a national voice.

For instance, in 1969, San Francisco was one of the most politically charged places in the world. A Mohawk from New York attending college in the Bay Area named Richard Oaks gathered college students from across the state to occupy Alcatraz Island. This was a largely publicized event but resulted in nothing substantial for the Indian community. These kinds of land seizures had been taking place across America in the late 1960s based on the 1868 Treaty of Ft. Laramie which granted certain unused government property back to Indians. Alcatraz was a turning point in Indian history because so many Indians came on independent accord to participate, thus Indians could now lead themselves and were also open to new kinds of leadership.16

To gain widespread exposure AIM needed a large victory like Alcatraz but that would focus on Indian conditions in hopes of changing mass public opinion thus mustering public support. This opportunity was made possible in February 1972 when an Indian named Raymond Yellow Thunder was kidnapped and killed in Gordon Nebraska as entertainment for white Gordon residents.17 When the culprits received lenient manslaughter charges, AIM took the drum along to protect its people. In Gordon evidence was presented by Banks himself indicting Gordon police of raping Indian women resulting in the dismissal of several police officers. In Gordon AIM also achieved an agreement for a federal investigation of the murder. The men received harsher sentences in the second trial.18 AIM changed everything pertaining to Indians in Gordon.

In Nebraska Russell Means, who had a reputation with the media, issued a statement that something heavy would happen at the verdict from the retrial. The statement proclaimed that AIM was prepared for a war and that if death was the cost for the unjust treatment of their people than AIM was willing to pay that price. Means has gone on the record saying that if a not-guilty verdict had been read “the worst was feared.” A local paper was phoned to print the statement. Means called for American flags to be flown upside down at the Yellow Thunder trial. This display was borrowed from the anti-war movement and it added to the drama of the demonstrations. 19Gordon was an experiment for Banks and Means in manipulating the media to give attention to AIM’s actions. The result of the experiment was the kind of tension that AIM was looking for.20

AIM and all Indians felt, or at least hoped, that the events of Gordon had put Indian killing away for good, however, in the Western U.S. violence against Indians actually increased. Nevertheless, the emotion and spirit that AIM had carried as its banner had begun to spread nationwide and non-AIM groups fought the injustice in their regions and communities.21 The passive, peaceful, and trusting Indians depicted in the media and folklore of America changed in 1972. Indian survival was ready for a nationwide campaign and AIM primed the pump.

In august of 1972 a meeting of Indian leaders was held at Crow Dogs Paradise. This was the home of Leonard Crow Dog the Sioux spiritual leader that Dennis Banks had sought out several years before on his personal spiritual quest. The Sun Dance was now popular among Indian leaders and in keeping with the Pan-Indian sentiment of the Red Power movement, the gathering assembled several Indian groups of various tribal backgrounds. Spirits were low after the resurging Indian violence of the summer and AIM as well as the other groups were desperate for something to regain some semblance of energy.

The idea of a protest in Washington D.C. did not arise overnight. Indians had watched Martin Luther King Jr. lead a million people into Washington. It was not until Robert Burnette, a Rosebud Sioux who had once been a tribal chair, proposed Indians “Finest Hour.” In a speech at the Sun Dance gathering Burnette, who was not a trusted AIM insider, was embraced as a new leader by Vernon Bellencourt (brother of Clyde B.) the acting national coordinator of AIM.22

The “Trail of Broken Treaties” was the name Burnette proposed for the protest. This was a reference to the Trail of Tears of the previous century as well as the 200 years of broken treaties between the United States and Native peoples. The protest was to address American Indian social conditions and Indian sovereignty. The plan was that by shaming and embarrassing the U.S. government, via the media and their own demonstrations, the protesters would build tension that would demand action.23 This was the new Indian attitude that was so critical in the AIM ideology. Embarrassing the government was physiological warfare against Indians patriarchal oppressor and it gave the ideological leaders a pulpit from which to perform.

At the meeting in August no one had been assigned to committees or planning parties. The idea of the trail was exciting but was still in the incubation period. It was too early for anyone involved to say confidently that the protest would actually take place. On September 21 Richard Oaks, the Mohawk leader instrumental in the occupation of Alcatraz, was murdered.24 The suspect was released on cheap bail in what was said to be a case of self-defense. To the AIM members this was yet another murder, like the one in Gordon, to defend. The murder of a fellow Indian leader motivated the physical formation of the Trail. If is difficult to suggest with certainty that the Trail of Broken Treaties would not have materialized without Oaks murder, however, the motivation it provided was a turning point in the laxity and uncertainty of the planning.

It was after the death of Oakes that an Assinibone Sioux, Hank Adams, residing in the North West became active in the planning of the trail. Adams was a critical figure in the siege of Alcatraz who negotiated with NCIO officers sent by the department of Interior during the standoff. Adams was not a boisterous, attention hungry, or rash speaking Indian leader like those in AIM. Adams was instead known for his research prowess, intellect, and persuasive cadence.25 Adams would prove to be an important asset to AIM in the coming weeks.

Energized by the death of Richard Oaks and already agitated by the murders of the summer, the planners from the Sun Dance were joined by fellow Indian groups at the New Albany Hotel in Denver to finalize the plans for the caravan. This group discussed a number of demands to be presented in Washington as well as events such as peaceful demonstrations at Potomac Park. Dennis Banks sent a letter to the Nixon office requesting a meeting but was politely turned down later due to scheduling conflicts. To AIM this was the government refusing to listen to Indian grievances but this was probably a misinterpretation due to the fact that the date requested was in the middle of election week.26

It was also decided in Denver that the trail would begin simultaneously in three different cities. Banks was to organize a trail leaving from San Francisco that would visit reservations in Nevada and Utah. A second trail, led by George Martin (Whitefish Ojibwa, Wisconsin), departed from Los Angeles that would make stops in Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Finally, Means would depart from Seattle with members of Hank Adams Survival of American Indians Association, stopping in Montana and the Dakotas.27 It was also decided that the three trails would meet for final planning on October 23 in St. Paul Minnesota.

Until the Denver gathering, AIM leaders Means, Banks, and Bellencourt had rather extravagant plans for the trail.28 These more radical ideas were set aside and combined with those of other Indian groups involved. After all, the Trail of Broken Treaties must be conducted on Indians best behavior, a phrase from Burnette’s speech at Crow Dog’s Paradise. It was well known that AIM could be dangerous to the legitimacy of the trail due to the leader’s outlandish behavior. It is difficult to speculate if this hurt the feelings of the AIM camp or if it later prompted their radical action in Washington as a means to achieve their own goals.

Donations were gathered at stops not only at churches and reservations but also Universities. The political atmosphere of the day primed young minds for contribution to the cause at America’s education institutions during the Vietnam War. These donations feed and kept the trail rolling. Indians looted anything not nailed down at many road side convenience stores on Means northern route. A stop was made by the Seattle train at a Montana National Park to set a plaque on the grounds of the Battle of Little Big Horn. This was a Lakota victory over the U.S. army in 1876. Sioux leader Sitting Bull who led the battle and created the Sun Dance led this resistance. Thus, this symbolized the spiritual element of red power that had influenced heavily the Indian conscious of AIM. 29 30

It is important to consider the amount of support that these reservation stops gained for the caravan. The leadership and the core of the protest were surprised by the number of Indians who were taking part in the caravan. The reservation stops that had been made drew several waves of Indians into Wahington. This underestimated crowd surely instigated an air of tension at the B.I.A. The crowd represented Indians from both urban and rural communities, a fact that the Nixon Administration would latter attempt to cover up. Up to 80% of the caravan was comprised of residents of reservations.31

It was in St. Paul that Hank Adams would make his most significant contribution to the campaign. For two entire days Adams meticulously grinded away at a list of grievances and proposals aimed at the U.S. government entitled the “Twenty Points.” 32 (See index). Adams involvement with the treaty rights in the North West fishing controversy and his prowess for writing were crucial to the validity of the document. Adams was not a member of AIM and was known for his sound judgment. The document’s main aim was to reestablish treaty negotiations with the United States.

Another little known detail of the converging of the caravans in Minnesota was the occupation of the BIA area office in St. Paul. Burnette, who was in Washington, was disturbed when he heard that Means and Banks had taken siege to the government building while on the Trail. This event only lasted two hours and there was no damage beside some alleged theft, however, the media had a field-day with this news and broadcast the week before the arrival in Washington predicted thirty to forty thousand Indians; this was an obvious exaggeration. Burnette phoned then AIM leaders from Washington and reprimanded them. After some harsh words by both sides AIM conceded to maintain the plan for peaceful protest.33

Banks and Means were not by any means logistically competent, at least not to this scale. As far as peaceful protest were concerned AIM were amateurs. Until the Trail, AIM had traditionally only participated in disobedient protest. Banks and Means also had AIM chapters to run during the planning of protests. This helps to explain why the AIM leaders were not actively involved in the planning of the Protest and instead given the job of collecting Indians from reservations. It was not until Washington that the more zealous leaders took the reins of an already tense situation.

On Wednesday evening, November 1st, the road weary warriors of the trail hoped to arrive to warm meals and generous sleeping arrangements. Interference in the trails goals for the week had been instigated by the Department of Interiors. This interference was a slap in the face to the caravan members who were cold, tired, and hungry. Cold hearted politics against the movement that led to inadequate accommodations directly influenced the emotions of the occupation to an enormous degree.

An Interior Department Memo surfaced during the trail that indicted Harrison Loesch (Assistant Secretary to the Department of Interiors who oversaw the BIA) of forbidding any government assistance to the Indians.34 This thwarted the efforts of Bob Burnette, who was assigned the task of negotiating housing for the Trail. Burnette had been in Washington for weeks planning demonstrations and meeting with politicians and media to promote the trail. By the time the protestors were forced to spend the night in a rat infested St. Stephens church basement, laying on one another on the floor, this memo was common knowledge on the trail. The psyche of the travelers who held their children as they were bitten by rats described as the size of cats were more than frazzled and frustrated. These conditions were a critical element in the shift of attitude of the caravan; an attitude instigated by AIM.

The day after over 300 Indians slept in the freezing and rat infested basement because the BIA had been denied the right to assist them, these and an increasing number of arriving Indians decided to travel across town to the steps and inside of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA was supposed to be in Washington to elevate Indian concerns but had long been the bane of Indian leaders working for significant change. Still, it was the only place that the protesters had to go and it was AIM’s idea. Clyde Bellencourt was instrumental in the decision to go to the BIA he encouraged the group, “Enough of this Bullshit! Let’s go have a talk with the BIA”. 35Just as at the conference of churches where Russell Means first joined AIM, when Clyde did choose to speak, his intimidating demeanor made both listeners and followers.

In the morning the Indians left for the BIA located only a short distance from the Whitehouse at Constitution Avenue and 19th Street. This mob did not simply pander on the steps of the building but quite literally made their selves at home. By mid-morning over 600 Indians had gathered making coffee and lounging in sofas as they waited wondering what to do. 36 Knowledge of the memo that attempted to stop the trail from even arriving in the city was widespread but the caravan had continued knowing that conflict would arise when the road weary members of the caravan arrived.

This was the tension that Banks and Means had hoped for, 600 Indians making camp in a government building nearly in sight of the Whitehouse. The situation had the possibility of media frenzy and AIM knew it. Since the planning of the protest had not primarily been AIM’s responsibility, and since their name was the one associated with the Trail of Broken Treaties, challenging the structure of the Trail by staging an AIM-style demonstration had to have been on the minds of these Leaders. From the time the group left St. Stephens church for the BIA, AIM was in charge.

The spirit of the trail was to put Americans on notice that Indians are willing to take things into their own hands.37 When BIA workers tried to make sense of why several hundred Indians were occupying the building Banks and Bellencourt were there to answer, “We have a meeting.”38 Throughout the morning more and more Indians began to arrive. These Indians came from the eastern reservations that had not been part of the caravan. These new arrivals expected to be protesting through the afternoon but instead joined the hundreds already at the BIA waiting for a meeting with someone of authority from the administration. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Harrison Loesch offered use of the larger Interior Department building.

As this news arrived to the building, a large number of the occupants were viewing a film in the BIA auditorium. The film was an Indian-produced documentary about the Northwestern fishing rights of Washington State natives. The film was entitled As Long as the Rivers Flow. One scene of the film showed police brutally beating an Indian which nearly worked the crowd into frenzy. While anger from the viewing was in the air the Indians began to evacuate the premises as AIM had agreed in negotiations.39

At this point the building was occupied, and even aggravated, but by no means was it taken over. As Indians set in wait in the BIA auditorium, riot police were hidden in a neighboring building waiting for commands as well. Shortly before 5pm on November 3rd Banks told the media that they would accept Loech’s offer but as closing time for the building approached several police officers began to escort out the protestors. A fight erupted between a Kansas Indian who was conversing with black civil-rights leader Stokley Carmichael, who had come to show his support for the Trail, and the police. All hell broke loose. Clyde Bellencourt proclaimed, “We’re not moving…. This is now the American Indian Embassy.”40 Russell Means went from office to office evacuating BIA employees. Young militants barricaded doors and stairways with desk and typewriters ready to defend the building with clubs and broken furniture if police entered.41 Russell Means shouted commands to barricade all doors and windows. Police from several state and municipal jurisdictions made retreat and then surrounded the building. AIM inherited the situation they would have asked for if they were in charge of the planning of the Trail and now a stand-off was taking place. Means and the AIM leaders had convinced a group of several hundred Indians to stand ground even if it cost their lives.42 A miscommunication was enough reason to put lives on the line for AIM.

Finally by evening, more players from the administration arrived. Loesch arrived with deputy chief of the BIA John Crow. These two men had met with Burnette a few days before and even oddly offered assistance to the trail, which in a backhanded manner, never materialized. Burnette, the AIM men, and the government officials met in the office of Loesch across the street from the BIA. Means and Banks immediately called for huge demands such as the resignation of Loesch and Crow for their animosity towards the trail. AIM seemed to have leaped from treaty rights and conditions of Indians to having the Bureau turned over to Indians themselves.43 Loesch expected that the occupiers evacuate the building before negotiations and Means in response told Loesch to go to hell, but regardless of words, a truce was made; at least for the time being.

AIM decided to stay the night and resume negotiations the next day while the Department of Interiors sought to evict the Indians by court order instead of by force. This was the Nixon Administration policy as it was implemented at Alcatraz and later in the related Pine Ridge reservation standoff in 1973. This lack of aggression on the part of Loesch and the Interior Department denied AIM the fight that they wanted; AIM wanted this fight for the media attention it could muster.44 Means has confessed to shouting “nigger” at black police on the outside of the barricaded building looking for a confrontation that could result in an Indian being assaulted on national TV. 45

A certain number of Bureau officials stayed with the occupiers including at least one high profile Indian, BIA Commissioner Louis Bruce (Mohawk). This was a move that eventually cost Bruce his employ with the government but he was willing to assist the Indians in negotiations and spoke publicly on behalf of the occupation to the media. More importantly Bruce was instrumental behind closed doors in negotiations.46 Bob Burnette and Hank Adams were also critical figure in the negotiations and were also often sympathetic but critical voices of reason to the AIM members. In the various players accounts it seems that Loesch sympathized slightly to the more rational thinking members of the Trail that were so to speak, more entangled with rather than committed to AIM.47

During the first days of the standoff papers reported, on behalf of an Interior department spokesman, that the Trail was made mostly of urban Indians fronted by militant radicals. In actuality this was the first significant stance against White America as a united Indian people ever.48 While this reported information was not true, the government was not the only group trying to manipulate the media. Loesch understood the kind of attention that AIM craved and hoped to deflate it. Likewise, inside the BIA Dennis Banks downplayed the staging of the takeover in calm collected interviews speaking of “meaningful change” and inviting people off the street to view the building as if it were a museum.49 Banks was successful enough in this that the barricaded building surrounded by riot troops was visited by celebrities such as Dr. Benjamin Spock and even an elementary school field trip.50

A pattern was created. There were several attempted raids of the building by police but nothing substantial. Everyday of the occupation a court order to evict the building kept tension in constant flux, partly because the first several of such court orders fizzled and a raid never occurred. Most wondered how long they would be inside the building and at what cost. When tensions were low, food and supplies were brought in by the Black Panthers and other various civil rights groups. Reports came in that tribal leaders had accused AIM of not being a grass-roots organization and this seemed to make the leaders paranoid. Morale was declining among the regulars but AIM was enjoying the exposure.51

While Indians from across the country laid suffering of boredom and the sacred drum beat on for another day, Means and Banks put displays for the news crews. Some of these cameras worked for Japanese and Russian news giving the AIM men a world stage on which to perform. Means gave fervent speeches several times a day. A few days into the affair Means heard that an Encyclopedia was interested in an interview. He ferociously scourged for change to make a phone call to fulfill his obligation to the events history.52 Banks himself describes in his account that himself and Bellencourt would dress their best donning blankets and their best Indian Garb to attract cameras.53

After several days of court ordered evictions that did not materialize, an epidemic of strep throat that had broken out convinced AIM to finally give into Loesch and company. They agreed to move the occupiers to the larger Labor Department auditorium. That should have been the end of the stand-off but AIM was no the only party guilty of miscommunication that week. As the last of the caravan was leaving the BIA, the first to leave were returning. The prodigal occupiers said that the building assigned to them was locked and they thought that this was typically BIA behavior to regress to trickery.54

The entire Trail turned increasingly militant after this complication and AIM was blamed for what ensued. The demonstrators, young and old, tore the BIA apart. Barricading increased and no piece of furniture or memorabilia was spared; even some Indian artifacts bore the burden of destruction. As this news reached the Administration, a court order to evict the building was now urgent. AIM was a part of the destruction and knew what was coming. They were now divided on how to deal with the coming eviction, or attack as AIM would call it. Suddenly dying for their cause or any further destruction could damage the reputation of their beloved organization. AIM would be responsible for the tainted name of the Trail, conflicted, AIM aired on the side of destruction.

Banks and Bellencourt were opposed to the destruction of the building but ironically Adams, the calm educated Sioux, and an obviously less ironic Means, wanted to burn the building down. As the hour of eviction neared and police outside readied a final negotiation team sans AIM was sent for deliberation. The building was doused with gasoline and the plan was to burn it from the top floor down thus making escape possible if necessary.55 As Means was about to strike the first match, Adams phoned the BIA from negotiations, news arrived that an agreement had been reached.

It is interesting to note that negotiations in the absence of AIM materialized into something concrete. Loesch agreed to seriously review the Trail’s Twenty Points and that none of the occupiers, even the zealous Means and Banks, would face any prosecution.56 Hank Adams fought on behalf of the AIM boys that had turned the Trail into such a fiasco. On the night of November 8th the AIM leaders agreed to leave the gas soaked and ransacked building, however, before the night was through a U-haul truck was loaded with decades of BIA files taken into custody by the occupiers. The idea for this theft was birthed by Hank Adams. The hope on the surface was to expose BIA injustice but it proved to be one of the many let-downs of the occupation.

The stolen files thought to expose the BIA to some sort of fraud ended up being worthless to AIM. All other positives of the trail are rather subjective assessments. One positive example was that part of the final negotiations called for an impressive 66,000 dollars in cash for the Trail to afford travel expenses back home.57 While this was allotted in increments of between twenty and one hundred dollars a person or carload, rumors that AIM was pocketing larger amounts quickly circulated. In essence, the BIA had paid off Indians to back down and it was possible that there was corruption in the handling of the funds. This seemed hypocritical to the Trail participants that were demonstrating with intent of changing this backwards government style of handling Indian Issues with buy-outs. All AIM members deny that there was any extortion of the money.

The occupation caused over 2 million dollars of damage to a government building but the government waited several weeks to begin repairing the building. Instead news media and members of congress were given tours of the destruction. The Nixon administration turned its back, more-or-less, to Indian affairs after the occupation. This was considered a setback to Indians who may have appreciated recent Indian interest from the administration and Indian-Government relations in general. Most importantly, AIM’s reputation was shattered.58 Many Indians and virtually all Indian organizations shunned AIM and the organization fractured from the inside out. Banks, Means, Adams, and Bellencourt had no reputation left to loose.

Instead of returning to reservations or their urban centers with heads hung low these leaders seemed more motivated in their cause than ever before. They had occupied a building a stones throw from the Whitehouse, during election week, for the entire week, and were rewarded with immunity and gas money home. These four men organized their masterpiece just one year later. This time armed to the teeth, AIM occupied and fortified a large portion of the Pine Ridge reservation that resulted in a 7 month standoff with the FBI. Banks and Means were more colorful than ever and Adams was again incorporated into the negotiation team. Burnette abstained from future encounters with AIM.

The Pine Ridge takeover in 1973 resulted in its own pile of pros and cons but ultimately restored much of AIMs reputation with the reservation community. Thus, the occupation of the BIA should be viewed neither as a blunder of arrogance on behalf of the AIM members or a waste of energy. Instead the occupation should be understood as a building block to a tower than would eventually topple. The odd mix of victory and defeat in Washington D.C. inspired what was left of AIM to more elaborate and more efficient protest. Banks, Means, and Bellencout, whose flamboyant behavior so often disrupted the maturity of the occupation, all went into acting in the following decades. Perhaps they found their calling to the stage and screen that week in Washington?

In the aftermath of the six day occupation, finger pointing inside the Department of Interiors over who was to blame for the situation led to the dismissal of Loesch, Crow, and regrettably Louis Bruce.59 This news gave the AIM leaders mixed emotions since they understood the agreement reached in negotiations in regard to the Trail’s Twenty Points was yet another broken promise on behalf of the government. AIM would attempt to wage war with the government with greater stakes at the Pine Ridge reservation the following year. Despite what lessons the occupation of the BIA had for Indians nationwide, for AIM the event taught only one lesson. AIM swore never again to be had by the United States government. AIM swore that never again would they surrender.

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Banks, Dennis, and Erdoes, Richard. Ojibwa Warrior Dennis Banks and the Rise of the American Indian Movement. New York: University of Oklahoma, 2004.

Burnette, Robert. The Road to Wounded Knee. New York: Bantam Books, 1974.

Means, Russell and Wolf, Marvin J. Where White Men Fear to Tread The Autobiography of Russell Means. Boston: St. Martin's Griffin, 1996.

Blair, William M., “Indians to Begin Capital Protest.” New York Times, October 31, 1972.

Blair, William M., “Indians in Capital Defy a Court Order.” New York Times, November 4, 1972.

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